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Principles for allocation of scarce medical interventions
Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer, Ezekiel J Emanuel
Allocation of very scarce medical interventions such as organs and vaccines is a persistent ethical challenge. We 
evaluate eight simple allocation principles that can be classifi ed into four categories: treating people equally, favouring 
the worst-off , maximising total benefi ts, and promoting and rewarding social usefulness. No single principle is 
suffi  cient to incorporate all morally relevant considerations and therefore individual principles must be combined 
into multiprinciple allocation systems. We evaluate three systems: the United Network for Organ Sharing points 
systems, quality-adjusted life-years, and disability-adjusted life-years. We recommend an alternative system—the 
complete lives system—which prioritises younger people who have not yet lived a complete life, and also incorporates 
prognosis, save the most lives, lottery, and instrumental value principles.
In health care, as elsewhere, scarcity is the mother of 
allocation.1 Although the extent is debated,2,3 the scarcity 
of many specifi c interventions—including beds in 
intensive care units,4 organs, and vaccines during 
pandemic infl uenza5—is widely acknowledged. For some 
interventions, demand exceeds supply. For others, an 
increased supply would necessitate redirection of 
important resources, and allocation decisions would still 
be necessary.6 
Allocation of scarce medical interventions is a perennial 
challenge. During the 1940s, an expert committee 
allocated—without public input—then-novel penicillin 
to American soldiers before civilians, using expected 
effi  cacy and speed of return to duty as criteria.7 During 
the 1960s, committees in Seattle allocated scarce dialysis 
machines using prognosis, current health, social worth, 
and dependants as criteria.7 How can scarce medical 
interventions be allocated justly? This paper identifi es 
and evaluates eight simple principles that have been 
suggested.8–12 Although some are better than others, no 
single principle allocates interventions justly. Rather, 
morally relevant simple principles must be combined 
into multiprinciple allocation systems. We evaluate three 
existing systems and then recommend a new one: the 
complete lives system.
Simple allocation principles
Eight simple ethical principles for allocation can be 
classifi ed into four categories, according to their core 
ethical values: treating people equally, favouring the 
worst-off , maximising total benefi ts, and promoting and 
rewarding social usefulness (table 1). We do not regard 
ability to pay as a plausible option for the scarce life-saving 
inter ventions we discuss.
Some people wrongly suggest that allocation can be 
based purely on scientifi c or clinical facts, often using the 
term “medical need”.13,14 There are no value-free medical 
criteria for allocation.15,16 Although biomedical facts 
determine a person’s post-transplant prognosis or the 
dose of vaccine that would confer immunity, responding 
to these facts requires ethical, value-based judgments. 
When evaluating principles, we need to distinguish 
between those that are insuffi  cient and those that are 
fl awed. Insuffi  cient principles ignore some morally 
relevant considerations. Conversely, fl awed principles 
recognise morally irrelevant considerations: inherently 
fl awed principles necessarily recognise irrelevant 
considerations, whereas practically fl awed principles 
allow irrelevant considerations to aff ect allocation. 
Principles that are individually insuffi  cient could form 
part of an acceptable multiprinciple system, whereas 
systems that include fl awed principles are untenable 
because they will always recognise irrelevant con-
siderations.
Treating people equally
Many scarce medical interventions, such as organ 
transplants, are indivisible. For indivisible goods, bene-
fi ting people equally entails providing equal chances at 
the scarce intervention—equality of opportunity, rather 
than equal amounts of it.1 Two principles attempt to 
embody this value.
Lottery
Allocation by lottery has been used, sometimes with 
explicit judicial and legislative endorsement, in military 
conscription, immigration, education, and distribution 
of vaccines.10,17,18
Lotteries have several attractions. Equal moral status 
supports an equal claim to scarce resources.19 Even 
among only roughly equal candidates, lotteries prevent 
small diff erences from drastically aff ecting outcome.18 
Some people also support lottery allocation because “each 
person’s desire to stay alive should be regarded as of the 
same importance and deserving the same respect as that 
of anyone else”.20 Practically, lottery allocation is quick 
and requires little knowledge about recipients.18 Finally, 
lotteries resist corruption.18 
The major disadvantage of lotteries is their blindness 
to many seemingly relevant factors.21,22 Random decisions 
between someone who can gain 40 years and someone 
who can gain only 4 months, or someone who has 
already lived for 80 years and someone who has lived 
only 20 years, are inappropriate. Treating people equally 
often fails to treat them as equals.23 Ultimately, although 
allocation solely by lottery is insuffi  cient, the lottery’s 
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simplicity and resistance to corruption suggests that it 
could be incorporated into a multiprinciple system.22
First-come, fi rst-served
Within health care, many people endorse a fi rst-come, 
fi rst-served distribution of beds in intensive care units24 
or organs for transplant.25 The American Thoracic Society 
defends this principle as “a natural lottery—an egalitarian 
approach for fair [intensive care unit] resource 
allocation.”24 Others believe it promotes fair equality of 
opportunity,25 and allows physicians to avoid 
discontinuing interventions, such as respirators, even 
when other criteria support moving those interventions 
to new arrivals.26 Some people simply equate it to lottery 
allocation.19 
As with lottery allocation, fi rst-come, fi rst-served ignores 
relevant diff erences between people, but in practice fails 
even to treat people equally. It favours people who are 
well-off , who become informed, and travel more quickly, 
and can queue for interventions without competing for 
employment or child-care concerns.27 Queues are also 
vulnerable to additional corruption. As New York State’s 
pandemic infl uenza planners stated, “Those who could 
fi guratively (and sometimes literally) push to the front of 
the line would be vaccinated and stand the best chance 
for survival”.28 First-come, fi rst-served allows morally 
irrelevant qualities—such as wealth, power, and 
connections—to decide who receives scarce interventions, 
and is therefore practically fl awed.
Favouring the worst-off : prioritarianism
Franklin Roosevelt argued that “the test of our progress 
is not whether we add more to the abundance of those 
who have much; it is whether we provide enough for 
those who have too little”.29 Philosophers call this 
preference for the worst-off  prioritarianism.30 Some 
defi ne being worst-off  as currently lacking valuable 
goods, whereas others defi ne it as lacking valuable goods 
throughout one’s entire life.8 Two principles embody 
these two interpretations.
Sickest fi rst
Treating the sickest people fi rst prioritises those with the 
worst future prospects if left untreated. The so-called rule 
of rescue, which claims that “our moral response to the 
imminence of death demands that we rescue the 
doomed”, exemplifi es this principle.31 Transplantable 
livers and hearts, as well as emergency-room care, are 
allocated to the sickest individuals fi rst.21
Some people might argue that treating the sickest 
individuals fi rst is intuitively obvious.32 Others claim that 
the sickest people are also probably worst off  overall, 
because healthier people might recover unaided or be 
saved later by new interventions.33 Finally, sickest-fi rst 
allocation appeals to prognosis if untreated—a criterion 
clinicians frequently consider.14
On its own, sickest-fi rst allocation ignores post-treatment 
prognosis: it applies even when only minor gains at high 
cost can be achieved. To circumvent this result, some 
Advantages Disadvantages Examples of use Recommendation
Treating people equally
Lottery Hard to corrupt; little information about 
recipients needed
Ignores other relevant principles Military draft; schools; 
vaccination
Include
First-come, 
fi rst-served
Protects existing doctor-patient relationships; 
little information about recipients needed
Favours wealthy, powerful, and well-connected; ignores 
other relevant principles
ICU beds; part of organ 
allocation
Exclude
Favouring the worst-off : prioritarianism
Sickest fi rst Aids those who are suff ering right now; appeals 
to “rule of rescue”; makes sense in temporary 
scarcity; proxy for being worst off  overall
Surreptitious use of prognosis; ignores needs of those who 
will become sick in future; might falsely assume temporary 
scarcity; leads to people receiving interventions only after 
prognosis deteriorates; ignores other relevant principles
Emergency rooms; part of 
organ allocation
Exclude
Youngest fi rst Benefi ts those who have had least life; prudent 
planners have an interest in living to old age
Undesirable priority to infants over adolescents and young 
adults; ignores other relevant principles
New NVAC/ACIP pandemic fl u 
vaccine proposal
Include
Maximising total benefi ts: utilitarianism
Number of lives 
saved
Saves more lives, benefi ting the greatest 
number; avoids need for comparative judgments 
about quality or other aspects of lives
Ignores other relevant principles Past ACIP/NVAC pandemic fl u 
vaccine policy; bioterrorism 
response policy; disaster triage 
Include
Prognosis or 
life-years saved
Maximises life-years produced Ignores other relevant principles, particularly distributive 
principles
Penicillin allocation; traditional 
military triage (prognosis) and 
disaster triage (life-years saved)
Include
Promoting and rewarding social usefulness
Instrumental value Helps promote other important values; future 
oriented
Vulnerable to abuse through choice of prioritised 
occupations or activities; can direct health resources away 
from health needs
Past and current NVAC/ACIP 
pandemic fl u vaccine policy
Include but only in some 
public health 
emergencies
Reciprocity Rewards those who implemented important 
values; past oriented
Vulnerable to abuse; can direct health resources away from 
health needs; intrusive assessment process
Some organ donation policies Include only irreplaceable 
people who have 
suff ered serious losses 
Table 1: Simple principles and their core ethical values
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misleadingly claim that sick people with a small but clear 
chance of benefi t do not have a medical need.13 Sick 
recipients’ prognoses are wrongly assumed to be normal, 
even though many interventions—such as liver 
transplants—are less eff ective for the sickest people.34
If the failure to take account of prognosis were its only 
problem, sickest-fi rst allocation would merely be 
insuffi  cient. However, it myopically bases allocation on 
how sick someone is at the current time—a morally 
arbitrary factor in genuine scarcity.16 Preferential 
allocation of a scarce liver to an acutely ill person 
unjustly ignores a currently healthier person with 
progressive liver disease, who might be worse off  when 
he or she later suff ers liver failure.8,22 Favouring those 
who are currently sickest seems to assume that resource 
scarcity is temporary: that we can save the person who is 
now sickest and then save the progressively ill person 
later.8,22 However, even temporary scarcity does not 
guarantee another chance to save the progressively ill 
person. Furthermore, when interventions are per-
sistently scarce, saving the progressively ill person later 
will always involve depriving others. When we cannot 
save everyone, saving the sickest fi rst is inherently 
fl awed and inconsistent with the core idea of priority to 
the worst-off .
Youngest fi rst
Although not always recognised as such, youngest-fi rst 
allocation directs resources to those who have had less 
of something supremely valuable—life-years.8 Dialysis 
machines and scarce organs have been allocated to younger 
recipients fi rst,35 and proposals for allocation in pandemic 
infl uenza prioritise infants and children.36 Daniel Callahan37 
has suggested strict age cut-off s for scarce life-saving 
interventions, whereas Alan Williams38 has suggested a 
system that allocates interventions based on individuals’ 
distance from a normal life-span if left unaided.
Prioritising the youngest gives priority to the 
worst-off —those who would otherwise die having had 
the fewest life-years—and is thus fundamentally diff erent 
from favouritism towards adults or people who are 
well-off .8,9 Also, allocating preferentially to the young has 
an appeal that favouring other worst-off  individuals such 
as women, poor people, or minorities lacks: “Because [all 
people] age, treating people of diff erent ages diff erently 
does not mean that we are treating persons unequally.”39 
Prudent planners would allocate life-saving interventions 
to themselves earlier in life to improve their chances of 
living to old age.39 These justifi cations explain much of the 
public preference for allocating scarce life-saving 
interventions to younger people.40,41
Strict youngest-fi rst allocation directs scarce resources 
predominantly to infants. This approach seems incorrect.5 
The death of a 20-year-old young woman is intuitively 
worse than that of a 2-month-old girl, even though the 
baby has had less life.40 The 20-year-old has a much more 
developed personality than the infant, and has drawn upon 
the investment of others to begin as-yet-unfulfi lled projects. 
Youngest-fi rst allocation also ignores prognosis,42 and 
categorically excludes older people.34 Thus, youngest-fi rst 
allocation seems insuffi  cient on its own, but it could be 
combined with prognosis and lottery principles in a 
multiprinciple allocation system.34
Maximising total benefi ts: utilitarianism
Maximising benefi ts is a utilitarian value, although 
principles diff er about which benefi ts to maximise. 
Save the most lives
One maximising strategy involves saving the most 
individual lives, and it has motivated policies on allocation 
of infl uenza vaccine5 and responses to bioterrorism.43 Since 
each life is valuable, this principle seems to need no special 
justifi cation. It also avoids comparing individual lives. 
Other things being equal, we should always save fi ve lives 
rather than one.44
However, other things are rarely equal. Some lives have 
been shorter than others; 20-year-olds have lived less than 
70-year-olds.40 Similarly, some lives can be extended longer 
than others. How to weigh these other relevant 
considerations against saving more lives—whether to save 
one 20-year-old, who might live another 60 years if saved, 
or three 70-year-olds who could only live for 10 years 
each—is unclear.45 Although insuffi  cient on its own, saving 
more lives should be part of a multiprinciple allocation 
system.
Prognosis or life-years
Rather than saving the most lives, prognosis allocation 
aims to save the most life-years. This strategy has been 
used in disaster triage and penicillin allocation, and 
motivates the exclusion of people with poor prognoses 
from organ transplantation waiting lists.7,21,46 Maximising 
life-years has intuitive appeal. Living more years is valuable, 
so saving more years also seems valuable.8 
However, even supporters of prognosis-based allocation 
acknowledge its inability to consider distribution as well as 
quantity.46 Making a well-off  person slightly better off  rather 
than slightly improving a worse-off  person’s life would be 
unjust; likewise, why give an extra year to a person who 
has lived for many when it could be given to someone who 
would otherwise die having had few?8,47 Similarly, giving a 
few life-years to many diff ers from giving many life-years 
to a few.8 As with the principle of saving the most lives, 
prognosis is undeniably relevant but insuffi  cient alone.
Promoting and rewarding social usefulness
Unlike the previous values, social value cannot direct 
allocation on its own.20 Rather, social value allocation 
prioritises specifi c individuals to enable them to promote 
other important values, or rewards them for having 
promoted these values.
In view of the multiplicity of reasonable values in society 
and in view of what is at stake, social value allocation must 
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not legislate socially conventional, mainstream values.1 
When Seattle’s dialysis policy favoured parents and 
church-goers, it was criticised: “The Pacifi c Northwest is 
no place for a Henry David Thoreau with kidney failure.”48 
Allocators must also avoid directing interventions 
earmarked for health needs to those not relevant to the 
health problem at hand, which covertly exacerbates 
scarcity.8,49 For instance, funeral directors might be essential 
to preserving health in an infl uenza pandemic, but not 
during a shortage of intensive-care beds.5
Instrumental value
Instrumental value allocation prioritises specifi c 
individuals to enable or encourage future usefulness. 
Guidelines that prioritise workers producing infl uenza 
vaccine exemplify instrumental value allocation to save 
the most lives.5 Responsibility-based allocation—eg, 
allocation to people who agree to improve their health 
and thus use fewer resources—also represents 
instrumental value allocation.50
This approach is necessarily insuffi  cient, because it 
derives its appeal from promoting other values, such as 
saving more lives: “all whose continued existence is 
clearly required so that others might live have a good 
claim to priority”.20 Prioritising essential health-care 
staff  does not treat them as counting for more in 
themselves, but rather prioritises them to benefi t 
others. Instrumental value allocation thus arguably 
recognises the moral importance of each person, even 
those not instrumentally valuable.
Student military deferments have shown that 
instrumental value allocation can encourage abuse of 
the system.51 People also disagree about usefulness: is 
saving all legislators necessary in an infl uenza 
pandemic?20 Decisions on usefulness can involve 
complicated and demeaning inquiries.52 However, 
where a specifi c person is genuinely indispensable in 
promoting morally relevant principles, instrumental 
value allocation can be appropriate.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity allocation is backward-looking, rewarding 
past usefulness or sacrifi ce. As such, many describe 
this allocative principle as desert or rectifi catory justice, 
rather than reciprocity. For important health-related 
values, reciprocity might involve preferential allocation 
to past organ donors,8 to participants in vaccine research 
who assumed risk for others’ benefi t,53 or to people who 
made healthy lifestyle choices that reduced their need 
for resources.50 Priority to military veterans embodies 
reciprocity for promoting non-health values.54
Proponents claim that “justice as reciprocity calls for 
providing something in return for contributions that 
people have made”.53 Reciprocity might also be relevant 
when people are conscripted into risky tasks. For instance, 
nurses required to care for contagious patients could 
deserve reciprocity, especially if they did not volunteer.
Reciprocity allocation, like instrumental value 
allocation, might potentially require time-consuming, 
intrusive, and demeaning inquiries, such as investi-
gating whether a person adhered to a healthy lifestyle.52,22 
Furthermore, unlike instrumental value, reciprocity 
does not have the future-directed appeal of promoting 
important health values. Ultimately, the appropriateness 
of allocation based on reciprocity seems to depend in a 
complex way on several factors, such as seriousness of 
sacrifi ce and irreplaceability. For instance, former organ 
donors seem to deserve reciprocity since they make a 
serious sacrifi ce and since there is no surplus of organ 
donors. By contrast, laboratory staff  who serve as 
vaccine production workers do not incur serious risk 
nor are they irreplaceable, so reciprocity seems less 
appropriate for them.
Assessing principles: allocation systems
Which principles best embody morally relevant values? 
First-come, fi rst-served is fl awed in practice because it 
unwittingly allows irrelevant considerations, such as 
wealth, to aff ect allocation decisions, whereas a lottery is 
insuffi  cient but not fl awed. Similarly, sickest-fi rst 
allocation is inherently fl awed, whereas the youngest-fi rst 
principle, though insuffi  cient, recognises the important 
value of priority to the worst-off . Both utilitarian 
principles—maximising lives saved and prognosis—are 
relevant but insuffi  cient, and usefulness and reciprocity 
are relevant where irreplaceable individuals make 
serious sacrifi ces, such as those during public health 
emergencies.
Ultimately, no principle is suffi  cient on its own to 
recognise all morally relevant considerations. Combining 
principles into systems increases complexity and contro-
versy, but is inevitable if allocations are to incorporate the 
complexity of our moral values (table 2). People disagree 
about which principles to include and how to balance 
them. Many allocation systems do not make their content 
explicit, nor do they justify their choices about inclusion, 
balancing, and specifi cation.1 Elucidating, comparing, 
and evaluating allocation systems should be a research 
priority.9
United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) points systems
The UNOS points systems are used for organ allocation 
(table 2). They combine three principles: sickest-fi rst 
(current medical condition); fi rst-come, fi rst-served 
(waiting time); and prognosis (antigen, antibody, and 
blood type matching between recipient and donor). 
UNOS weights principles diff erently depending on the 
organ distributed. Kidney and pancreas allocation is 
mainly by waiting time, with some weight given to 
sickest-fi rst and prognosis.55 Conversely, heart allocation 
weights sickest-fi rst principles heavily and waiting time 
less so.55 Lung and liver allocation takes into account 
waiting time, sickest-fi rst, and prognosis.55 Historically, 
no UNOS system has emphasised prognosis, although 
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UNOS’s most recent policy discussions on lung allocation 
suggest such a change.56
The UNOS point systems are fl exible: conceivably, they 
could include any simple principle by translating it into a 
points framework. The systems are easily revisable to 
weight one principle more heavily than others.
Current UNOS systems incorporate two fl awed simple 
principles: fi rst-come, fi rst-served and sickest fi rst. They 
are also vulnerable to additional exploitation. Taking 
advantage of the fi rst-come, fi rst-served principle, well-off  
patients place themselves on multiple waiting lists.57 
Exploiting the sickest-fi rst element, some transplant 
centres have temporarily altered or misrepresented their 
patients’ health state to get them scarce organs, making 
sickest-fi rst both practically and inherently fl awed.58,59
Furthermore, UNOS points systems do not 
appropriately consider the benefi t-maximising principles, 
prognosis, and saving the most lives, nor do they include 
youngest-fi rst allocation. Most dramatically, multiple-
organ transplants to one individual are permitted, even 
when a heart-lung-liver combination could save three 
lives if transplanted separately.8,60 Similarly, policy 
revisions during the 1990s de-emphasised organ-recipient 
matching even though poorer matching leads to fewer 
lives saved.61
Attempts to remedy these defi ciencies have been covert 
and haphazard. In an eff ort to implement prognosis 
allocation tacitly, ill or old people have been excluded 
from supposedly fi rst-come, fi rst-served waiting lists.62 
Physicians can misdiagnose comorbidities as contra-
indications, wrongly implying that transplants will harm 
recipients, rather than explicitly practising prognosis-
based allocation.63 Some have proposed so-called 
old-for-old policies that match donor organ age to 
recipient age—misrepresenting both youngest-fi rst and 
prognosis-based allocation as biological fact.64 Others 
have advocated local rather than national waiting lists to 
circumvent sickest-fi rst allocation.60,65 Explicit and public 
acknowledgment of allocation strategies would be 
preferable to this surreptitious and piecemeal approach.
Quality-adjusted life-years
Allocation systems based on quality-adjusted life-years 
(QALY) have two parts (table 2). One is an outcome 
measure that considers the quality of life-years. As an 
example, the quality-of-life measure used by the UK 
National Health Service rates moderate mobility 
impairment as 0·85 times perfect health.66 QALY 
allocation therefore equates 8·5 years in perfect health to 
10 years with moderately impaired mobility.67 The other 
part of QALY allocation is a maximising assumption: that 
justice requires total QALYs to be maximised without 
consideration of their distribution.46,68 QALY allocation 
initially constituted the basis for Oregon’s Medicaid 
coverage initiative, and is currently used by the UK’s 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE).69,70 Both the ethics and effi  cacy of QALY allocation 
have been substantially discussed.46
The QALY outcome measure has problems. Even if a 
life-year in which a person has impaired mobility is worse 
than a healthy life-year, someone adapted to wheelchair 
use might reasonably value an additional life-year in a 
wheelchair as much as a non-disabled person would 
value an additional life-year without disability.71 Allocators 
have struggled with this issue.72
More importantly, maximising the number of QALYs is 
an insuffi  cient basis for allocation. Although QALY 
advocates appeal to the idea that all QALYs are equal, 
Principles included Advantages Objections
UNOS points 
systems for 
organ allocation 
in the USA
First-come, fi rst-served; 
sickest-fi rst; prognosis
Can combine all possible principles; fl exible Includes least justifi able principles: fi rst-come, fi rst-served and 
sickest-fi rst; low priority given to prognosis; vulnerable to bias 
and manipulation, such as being listed on multiple 
transplantation lists and misrepresentation of health status; 
allows multiple organ transplants, thus saving fewer lives
QALY allocation Prognosis; excludes save 
the most lives
Maximises future benefi ts; considers quality 
of life; used in many existing, quantitatively 
sophisticated frameworks
Outcome measure disadvantages disabled people; incorrect 
conception of equality by focusing on equality of QALYs rather 
than equality of persons; does not incorporate many relevant 
principles
DALY allocation Prognosis; instrumental 
value; excludes save the 
most lives
Maximises future benefi ts; includes 
instrumental value, saving people whose 
productivity is key to a fl ourishing society
Outcome measure disadvantages disabled people; age 
considered as modifying value of individual life-years, rather than 
from standpoint of distributive justice; defi nition of instrumental 
value is too focused on economic worth, and could justify bias 
towards heads of household and other “traditional” social 
positions; does not incorporate many relevant principles
Complete lives 
system
Youngest-fi rst; 
prognosis; save the 
most lives; lottery; 
instrumental value, but 
only in public health 
emergency
Matches intuition that death of adolescents 
is worse than that of infants or elderly; 
everyone has an interest in living through all 
life stages; incorporates the largest number 
of relevant principles; resistant to corruption 
Reduced chances for persons who have lived many years; life-years 
are not a relevant health care outcome; unable to deal with 
international diff erences in life expectancy; need lexical priority 
rather than balancing; complete lives system is not appropriate for 
general distribution of health care resources
UNOS=United Network for Organ Sharing. QALY=quality-adjusted life-years. DALY=disability-adjusted life-years.
Table 2: Four multiprinciple systems
Department of Ethics
428 www.thelancet.com   Vol 373   January 31, 2009
people, not QALYs, deserve equal treatment.73 Treatment 
of a serious disease such as appendicitis gives a few 
people many more QALYs, whereas treatment of a minor 
problem like uncapped teeth gives many people a few 
more QALYs.70 Even though the two strategies produce 
equal numbers of QALYs, they treat individuals very 
diff erently.8 Likewise, giving QALYs to someone who has 
had few life-years diff ers morally from giving them to 
someone who has already had many.8,47 Ultimately, QALY 
allocation systems do not recognise many morally 
relevant values—such as treating people equally, giving 
priority to the worst-off , and saving the most lives—and 
are therefore insuffi  cient for just allocation.
Disability-adjusted life-years
WHO endorses the system of disability-adjusted life-year 
(DALY) allocation (table 2).74 As with QALY allocation, 
DALY allocation does not consider interpersonal 
distribution. DALY systems also incorporate quality-of-life 
factors—for instance, they equate a life-year with blindness 
to roughly 0·6 healthy life-years.74 Additionally, DALY 
allocation ranks each life-year with the age of the person as 
a modifi er: “The well-being of some age groups, we argue, 
is instrumental in making society fl ourish; therefore 
collectively we may be more concerned with improving 
health status for individuals in these age groups.”74 This 
argument, although used to justify age-weighting, would 
equally justify counting the life-years of economically 
productive people and those caring for others for more.
DALY allocation wrongly incorporates age into the 
outcome measure, claiming that a year for a younger 
person is in itself more valuable. Priority for young people 
is better justifi ed on grounds of distributive justice.41 Also, 
the use of instrumental value to justify DALY allocation 
resembles that used in Seattle’s dialysis allocation, which 
inappropriately favoured wage earners and carers of 
dependants.7,48
The complete lives system
Because none of the currently used systems satisfy all 
ethical requirements for just allocation, we propose an 
alternative: the complete lives system. This system 
incorporates fi ve principles (table 2): youngest-fi rst, 
prognosis, save the most lives, lottery, and instrumental 
value.5 As such, it prioritises younger people who have not 
yet lived a complete life and will be unlikely to do so 
without aid. Many thinkers have accepted complete lives 
as the appropriate focus of distributive justice: “individual 
human lives, rather than individual experiences, [are] the 
units over which any distributive principle should 
operate.”1,75,76 Although there are important diff erences 
between these thinkers, they share a core commitment to 
consider entire lives rather than events or episodes, which 
is also the defi ning feature of the complete lives system.
Consideration of the importance of complete lives also 
supports modifying the youngest-fi rst principle by 
prioritising adolescents and young adults over infants 
(fi gure). Adolescents have received substantial education 
and parental care, investments that will be wasted without 
a complete life. Infants, by contrast, have not yet received 
these investments. Similarly, adolescence brings with it a 
developed personality capable of forming and valuing 
long-term plans whose fulfi lment requires a complete 
life.77 As the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin argues, “It 
is terrible when an infant dies, but worse, most people 
think, when a three-year-old child dies and worse still when 
an adolescent does”;78 this argument is supported by 
empirical surveys.41,79 Importantly, the prioritisation of 
adolescents and young adults considers the social and 
personal investment that people are morally entitled to 
have received at a particular age, rather than accepting the 
results of an unjust status quo. Consequently, poor 
adolescents should be treated the same as wealthy ones, 
even though they may have received less investment owing 
to social injustice.
The complete lives system also considers prognosis, 
since its aim is to achieve complete lives. A young person 
with a poor prognosis has had few life-years but lacks the 
potential to live a complete life. Considering prognosis 
forestalls the concern that disproportionately large 
amounts of resources will be directed to young people with 
poor prognoses.42 When the worst-off  can benefi t only 
slightly while better-off  people could benefi t greatly, 
allocating to the better-off  is often justifi able.1,30 Some small 
benefi ts, such as a few weeks of life, might also be 
intrinsically insignifi cant when compared with large 
benefi ts.8
Saving the most lives is also included in this system 
because enabling more people to live complete lives is 
better than enabling fewer.8,44 In a public health emergency, 
instrumental value could also be included to enable more 
people to live complete lives. Lotteries could be used when 
making choices between roughly equal recipients, and also 
potentially to ensure that no individual—irrespective of 
age or prognosis—is seen as beyond saving.34,80 Thus, the 
complete lives system is complete in another way: it 
incorporates each morally relevant simple principle.
When implemented, the complete lives system produces 
a priority curve on which individuals aged between 
roughly 15 and 40 years get the most substantial chance, 
whereas the youngest and oldest people get chances that 
are attenuated (fi gure).78 It therefore superfi cially resembles 
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Figure: Age-based priority for receiving scarce medical interventions under 
the complete lives system
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the proposal made by DALY advocates; however, the 
complete lives system justifi es preference to younger 
people because of priority to the worst-off  rather than 
instrumental value. Additionally, the complete lives system 
assumes that, although life-years are equally valuable to all, 
justice requires the fair distribution of them. Conversely, 
DALY allocation treats life-years given to elderly or disabled 
people as objectively less valuable.
Finally, the complete lives system is least vulnerable to 
corruption. Age can be established quickly and accurately 
from identity documents. Prognosis allocation encourages 
physicians to improve patients’ health, unlike the perverse 
incentives to sicken patients or misrepresent health that 
the sickest-fi rst allocation creates.58,59
Objections
We consider several important objections to the complete 
lives system. 
The complete lives system discriminates against older 
people.81,82 Age-based allocation is ageism.82 Unlike alloc-
ation by sex or race, allocation by age is not invidious 
discrimination; every person lives through diff erent life 
stages rather than being a single age.8,39 Even if 25-year-olds 
receive priority over 65-year-olds, everyone who is 
65 years now was previously 25 years.16 Treating 65-year-
olds diff erently because of stereotypes or falsehoods would 
be ageist; treating them diff erently because they have 
already had more life-years is not.
Age, like income, is a “non-medical criterion” inappro-
priate for allocation of medical resources.14,83 In contrast to 
income, a complete life is a health outcome. Long-term 
survival and life expectancy at birth are key health-care 
outcome variables.84 Delaying the age at onset of a disease 
is desirable.85,86 
The complete lives system is insensitive to international 
diff erences in typical lifespan. Although broad consensus 
favours adolescents over very young infants, and young 
adults over the very elderly people, implementation can 
reasonably diff er between, even within, nation-states.87,88 
Some people believe that a complete life is a universal limit 
founded in natural human capacities, which everyone 
should accept even without scarcity.37 By contrast, the 
complete lives system requires only that citizens see a 
complete life, however defi ned, as an important good, and 
accept that fairness gives those short of a complete life 
stronger claims to scarce life-saving resources.
Principles must be ordered lexically: less important 
principles should come into play only when more 
important ones are fulfi lled.10 Rawls himself agreed that 
lexical priority was inappropriate when distributing specifi c 
resources in society, though appropriate for ordering the 
principles of basic social justice that shape the distribution 
of basic rights, opportunities, and income.1 As an 
alternative, balancing priority to the worst-off  against 
maximising benefi ts has won wide support in discussions 
of allocative local justice.1,8,30 As Amartya Sen argues, justice 
“does not specify how much more is to be given to the 
deprived person, but merely that he should receive 
more”.89
Accepting the complete lives system for health care as a 
whole would be premature. We must fi rst reduce waste 
and increase spending.81,90 The complete lives system 
explicitly rejects waste and corruption, such as multiple 
listing for transplantation. Although it may be applicable 
more generally, the complete lives system has been 
developed to justly allocate persistently scarce life-saving 
interventions.39,80 Hearts for transplant and infl uenza 
vaccines, unlike money, cannot be replaced or diverted to 
non-health goals; denying a heart to one person makes it 
available to another. Ultimately, the complete lives system 
does not create “classes of Untermenschen whose lives and 
well being are deemed not worth spending money on”,91 
but rather empowers us to decide fairly whom to save 
when genuine scarcity makes saving everyone impossible.
Legitimacy
As well as recognising morally relevant values, an allocation 
system must be legitimate. Legitimacy requires that people 
see the allocation system as just and accept actual 
allocations as fair. Consequently, allocation systems must 
be publicly understandable, accessible, and subject to 
public discussion and revision.92 They must also resist 
corruption, since easy corruptibility undermines the public 
trust on which legitimacy depends. Some systems, like the 
UNOS points systems or QALY systems, may fail this test, 
because they are diffi  cult to understand, easily corrupted, 
or closed to public revision. Systems that intentionally 
conceal their allocative principles to avoid public complaints 
might also fail the test.93
Although procedural fairness is necessary for legitimacy, 
it is unable to ensure the justice of allocation decisions on 
its own.94,95 Although fair procedures are important, 
substantive, morally relevant values and principles are 
indispensable for just allocation.96,97 
Conclusion
Ultimately, none of the eight simple principles recognise 
all morally relevant values, and some recognise irrelevant 
values. QALY and DALY multiprinciple systems neglect 
the importance of fair distribution. UNOS points systems 
attempt to address distributive justice, but recognise 
morally irrelevant values and are vulnerable to corruption. 
By contrast, the complete lives system combines four 
morally relevant principles: youngest-fi rst, prognosis, 
lottery, and saving the most lives. In pandemic situations, 
it also allocates scarce interventions to people instrumental 
in realising these four principles. Importantly, it is not an 
algorithm, but a framework that expresses widely affi  rmed 
values: priority to the worst-off , maximising benefi ts, and 
treating people equally. To achieve a just allocation of 
scarce medical interventions, society must embrace the 
challenge of implementing a coherent multiprinciple 
framework rather than relying on simple principles or 
retreating to the status quo.
Department of Ethics
430 www.thelancet.com   Vol 373   January 31, 2009
Confl ict of interest statement
We delare that we have no confl ict of interest.
Acknowledgments
We thank Dan Brock, Daniel Callahan, David Heyd, Frances Kamm, 
Dennis Thompson, members of the Department of Bioethics, and two 
peer reviewers for helpful suggestions. The views expressed are the 
authors’ own. They do not refl ect any position or policy of the National 
Institutes of Health, US Public Health Service, or Department of Health 
and Human Services.
References
1 Rawls J. A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
2 Harris J. QALYfying the value of life. J Med Ethics 1987; 13: 117–23.
3 Caplan AL. Organ transplant rationing: a window to the future? 
Health Prog 1987; 68: 40–45.
4 Truog RD, Brock DW, Cook DJ, et al. Rationing in the intensive care 
unit. Crit Care Med 2006; 34: 958–63.
5 Emanuel EJ, Wertheimer A. Who should get infl uenza vaccine 
when not all can? Science 2006; 312: 854–55.
6 Veatch RM. Disaster preparedness and triage. Mount Sinai J Med 
2005; 72: 236–41.
7 McGough LJ, Reynolds SJ, Quinn TC, Zenilman JM. Which 
patients fi rst? Setting priorities for antiretroviral therapy where 
resources are limited. Am J Pub Health 2005; 95: 1173–80.
8 Kamm FM. Morality, mortality, volume 1: death and whom to save 
from it. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
9 Cookson R, Dolan P. Principles of justice in health care rationing. 
J Med Ethics 2000; 26: 323–29.
10 Arras JD. Rationing vaccine during an avian infl uenza pandemic: 
why it won’t be easy. Yale J Biol Med 2005; 78: 287–300.
11 Rescher N. The allocation of exotic medical lifesaving therapy. 
Ethics 1969; 79: 173–86.
12 Beauchamp T, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
13 Langford MJ. Who should get the kidney machine? J Med Ethics 
1992; 18: 12–17.
14 Liss P-E. Hard choices in public health: the allocation of scarce 
resources. Scand J Public Health 2003; 31: 156–57.
15 Hope T, Sprigings D, Crisp R. “Not clinically indicated”: patients’ 
interests or resource allocation? BMJ 1993; 306: 379–81.
16 Brock DW. The misplaced role of urgency in allocation of 
persistently scarce life-saving organs. In: Gutmann T, Land W, 
Daar AS, Sells RA, eds. Ethical, legal, and social issues in organ 
transplantation. Lengerich, Germany: 
Pabst Science Publishers 2004: 41–48.
17 Silverman WA, Chalmers I. Casting and drawing lots: a time 
honoured way of dealing with uncertainty and ensuring fairness. 
BMJ 2001; 323: 1467–68.
18 Broome J. Selecting people randomly. Ethics 1984; 95: 38–55.
19 Ramsey P. The patient as person: exploration in medical ethics. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.
20 Harris J. The value of life. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.
21 Stein MS. The distribution of life-saving medical resources: 
equality, life expectancy, and choice behind the veil. 
Soc Philos Policy 2002; 19: 212–45.
22 Elhauge E. Allocating health care morally. Calif Law Rev 1994; 
82: 1449–1544.
23 Dworkin RM. Sovereign virtue: the theory and practice of equality. 
New York: Harvard University Press, 2002.
24 American Thoracic Society Bioethics Task Force. Fair allocation of 
intensive care unit resources. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 1997; 
156: 1282–1301.
25 Childress JF. Putting patients fi rst in organ allocation: an ethical 
analysis of the US debate. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2001; 10: 365–76.
26 Lo B, White DB. Intensive care unit triage during an infl uenza 
pandemic: the need for specifi c clinical guidelines. Paper 
presented at: Ethical and legal considerations in mitigating 
pandemic disease. Washington, DC; 2007.
27 Daniels N. Fair process in patient selection for antiretroviral 
treatment in WHO’s goal of 3 by 5. Lancet 2005; 366: 169–71.
28 Billittier AJ. Who goes fi rst? J Public Health Manag Pract 2005; 
11: 267–68.
29 Roosevelt FD. Second Inaugural Address, 1937; Washington, DC.
30 Parfi t D. Equality and priority. Ratio 1997; 10: 202–21.
31 Jonsen AR. Bentham in a box: technology assessment and health 
care allocation. Law Med Health Care 1986; 14: 172–74.
32 McKerlie D. Justice between the young and the old. Philos Publ Aff  
2001; 30: 152–77.
33 Veatch RM. Equity in liver allocation: Professor Veatch’s reply. 
Med Ethics 2001: 7.
34 Howard DH. Hope versus effi  ciency in organ allocation. 
Transplantation 2001; 72: 1169–73.
35 Rutecki GW, Kilner JF. Dialysis as a resource allocation 
paradigm: confronting tragic choices once again? Semin Dial 
1999; 12: 38–43.
36 Department of Health and Human Services. Draft guidance on 
allocating and targeting pandemic infl uenza vaccine. http://www.
pandemicfl u.gov/vaccine/prioritization.pdf 
(accessed Jan 19, 2009). 
37 Callahan DD. Setting limits: medical goals in an aging society. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; 1995.
38 Williams A. Inequalities in health and intergenerational equity. 
Ethical Theory Moral Pract 1999; 2: 47–55.
39 Daniels N. Am I my parents’ keeper? An essay on justice between 
the young and the old. Oxford University Press, 1988.
40 McKie J, Richardson J. Neglected equity issues in cost-eff ectiveness 
analysis, Part 1: severity of pre-treatment condition, realisation of 
potential for health, concentration and dispersion of health benefi ts, 
and age-related social preferences. Melbourne: Centre for Health 
Program Evaluation, 2005.
41 Tsuchiya A, Dolan P, Shaw R. Measuring people’s preferences 
regarding ageism in health: some methodological issues and some 
fresh evidence. Soc Sci Med 2003; 57: 687.
42 Brock DW. Children’s rights to health care. J Med Philos 2001; 
26: 163–77.
43 Phillips S. Current status of surge research. Acad Emerg Med 2006; 
13: 1103–08.
44 Hsieh N-H, Strudler A, Wasserman D. The numbers problem. 
Philos Publ Aff  2006; 34: 352–72.
45 Glover J. Causing death and saving lives. New York: Penguin, 1977.
46 Russell LB, Siegel JE, Daniels N, Gold MR, Luce BR, 
Mandelblatt JS. Cost-eff ectiveness analysis as a guide to resource 
allocation in health: roles and limitations. In: Gold MR, Siegel JE, 
Russell LB, Weinstein MC, eds. Cost-eff ectiveness in health and 
medicine. New York: Oxford University Press; 1996: 3–24.
47 Kappel K, Sandøe P. QALYs, age and fairness. Bioethics 1992; 
6: 297–316.
48 Sanders D, Dukeminier J. Medical advance and legal lag: 
hemodialysis and kidney transplantation. UCLA Law Rev 1968; 
15: 357–419.
49 Brock DW. Separate spheres and indirect benefi ts. 
Cost Eff  Resour Alloc 2003; 1: 4.
50 Morreim EH. Lifestyles of the risky and infamous. From managed 
care to managed lives. Hastings Center Report 1995; 25: 5–12.
51 Burgess EW. The eff ect of war on the American family. 
Am J Sociol 1942; 48: 343–52.
52 Anderson ES. What is the point of equality? Ethics 1999; 
109: 287–337.
53 Macklin R. Ethics and equity in access to HIV treatment: 
3 by 5 initiative. 2004.
54 Kass L. Session 5: Organ donation, procurement, allocation, and 
transplantation: policy options: The President’s Council on 
Bioethics; 2006.
55 United Network for Organ Sharing. Policies. http://www.unos.org/
policiesandbylaws/policies.asp (accessed Sept 30, 2008).
56 Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. Public Forum to 
Discuss Kidney Allocation Policy Development Synopsis, 2007; 
Dallas.
57 Zink S, Wertlieb S, Catalano J, Marwin V. Examining the potential 
exploitation of UNOS policies. Am J Bioethics 2005; 5: 6.
58 Murphy TF. Gaming the transplant system. Am J Bioethics 2004; 
4: W28.
59 Morreim EH. Another kind of end-run: status upgrades. 
Am J Bioethics 2005; 5: 11.
Department of Ethics
www.thelancet.com   Vol 373   January 31, 2009 431
60 Stein MS. The distribution of life-saving medical resources: 
equality, life expectancy, and choice behind the veil. Soc Philos Policy 
2002: 19.
61 Mutinga N, Brennan DC, Schnitzler MA. Consequences of 
eliminating HLA-B in deceased donor kidney allocation to increase 
minority transplantation. Am J Transplant 2005; 5: 1090.
62 Oniscu GC, Schalkwijk AAH, Johnson RJ, Brown H, Forsythe JLR. 
Equity of access to renal transplant waiting list and renal 
transplantation in Scotland: cohort study. BMJ 2003; 327: 1261.
63 Miller LW. Listing criteria for cardiac transplantation: results of an 
American Society of Transplant Physicians-National Institutes of 
Health conference. Transplantation 1998; 66: 947–51.
64 Arns W, Citterio F, Campistol JM. Old-for-old—new strategies for 
renal transplantation. Nephrol Dial Transplant 2007; 22: 336–41.
65 Alexander GC, Werner RM, Ubel PA. The costs of denying scarcity. 
Arch Intern Med 2004; 164: 593–96.
66 Kind P, Hardman G, Macran S, University of York Centre for 
Health E. UK Population Norms for EQ-5D: Centre for Health 
Economics, University of York; 1999.
67 National Institute for Clinical Excellence. Guide to the methods of 
technology appraisal. NICE: London; 2003.
68 McGregor M. Cost-utility analysis: Use QALYs only with great 
caution. CMAJ 2003; 168: 433.
69 Rawlins MD, Culyer AJ. National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
and its value judgments. BMJ 2004; 329: 224.
70 Hadorn DC. The Oregon priority-setting exercise: quality of life and 
public policy. Hastings Center Report 1991; 21: S11–16.
71 Menzel P, Dolan P, Richardson J, Olsen JA. The role of adaptation 
to disability and disease in health state valuation: a preliminary 
normative analysis. Soc Sci Med 2002; 55: 2149.
72 Ubel PA, Nord E, Gold M, Menzel P, Prades JL, Richardson J. 
Improving value measurement in cost-eff ectiveness analysis. 
Med Care 2000; 38: 892.
73 Pronovost P, Angus DC. Economics of end-of-life care in the 
intensive care unit. Crit Care Med 2001; 29 (2 suppl): N46–N51.
74 Murray CJL, Acharya AK. Understanding DALYs. J Health Econ 
1997; 16: 703.
75 Nagel T. Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press; 
2000.
76 Aristotle. Nicomachean ethics. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
77 Shaff er DR, Kipp K. Developmental psychology: childhood and 
adolescence, 6th edn. London: Wadsworth, 2007.
78 Dworkin RM. Life’s dominion. Knopf, 1993.
79 Richardson J. Age weighting and discounting: what are the ethical 
Issues? Melbourne: Centre for Health Program Evaluation; 1999.
80 Schwappach DLB. Resource allocation, social values and the QALY: 
a review of the debate and empirical evidence. Health Expectations 
2002; 5: 210–22.
81 Jecker NS, Pearlman RA. Ethical constraints on rationing medical 
care by age. J Am Geriatr Soc 1989; 37: 1067–75. 
82 Rivlin MM. Protecting elderly people: fl aws in ageist arguments. 
BMJ 1995; 310: 1179–82.
83 American Medical Association. Allocation of limited medical 
resources. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/Code_
of_Med_Eth/opinion/opinion203.html (accessed Jan 19, 2009).
84 Mathers CD, Sadana R, Salomon JA, Murray CJL, Lopez AD. Healthy 
life expectancy in 191 countries, 1999. Lancet 2001; 357: 1685.
85 Atkinson MA, Eisenbarth GS. Type 1 diabetes: new perspectives on 
disease pathogenesis and treatment. Lancet 2001; 358: 221.
86 Tang M-X, Jacobs D, Stern Y, et al. Eff ect of oestrogen during 
menopause on risk and age at onset of Alzheimer’s disease. Lancet 
1996; 348: 429.
87 Emanuel EJ. Finding new ethical conceptions through practical 
ethics: global justice and the “standard of care” debates. Paper 
presented at: University of Toronto Center for Ethics, Inaugural 
Conference: Is there progress in ethics? Toronto, Canada; 2006.
88 Rawls J. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2001.
89 Sen A. On economic inequality: Oxford University Press; 1973.
90 Lanken PN, Terry PB, Osborne ML. Ethics of allocating intensive 
care unit resources. Baltimore: New horizons, 1997: 5.
91 Evans JG. The rationing debate: Rationing health care by age: the 
case against. BMJ 1997; 314: 822.
92 Daniels N. Accountability for reasonableness. BMJ 2000; 321: 1300.
93 Calabresi G, Bobbitt P. Tragic choices: the confl icts society 
confronts in the allocation of tragically scarce resources. 
WW Norton and Company; 1978.
94 Daniels N. How to achieve fair distribution of ARTs in 3 by 5: fair 
process and legitimacy in patient selection. Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2004.
95 Mielke J, Martin DK, Singer PA. Priority setting in a hospital critical 
care unit: qualitative case study. Crit Care Med 2003; 31: 2764–68.
96 Hasman A, Holm S. Accountability for reasonableness: opening the 
black box of process. Health Care Analysis 2005; 13: 261.
97 Friedman A. Beyond accountability for reasonableness. Bioethics 
2008; 22: 101–12.
